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Abstract: This paper is the first attempt in the literature to investigate the effects of 
public social security on aggregate consumption in a time-series setting for a developing 
country, Turkey that has one of the most generous social security systems in the OECD 
region.  In order to quantify the social security variable, the paper uses the social 
security wealth (SSW) series calculated for Turkey in a separate study. This study 
indicates that SSW is the largest part of the household wealth in Turkey and therefore 
should not be ignored in the aggregate consumption studies. After having all sensitivity 
tests for the major assumptions embedded in the SSW series, it shows that SSW has 
robust and positive effects on aggregate consumption, and therefore the PAYG system 
suppresses the Turkish national saving approximately 25% in 2003.  
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Public insurance is the single largest item in government budgets and has a 
significant impact on the lives of thousands of people.  In addition to its effect on the living 
standards of elderly people, Social Security may alter people’s behavior in ways that could 
affect the economy.  People who are entitled to some sort of social security payments in the 
future may prefer to consume more today and save less for their retirement.  If public social 
security is unfunded (pay-as-you-go —PAYG), this decrease in personal saving may even 
reduce national saving.  
There are two types of studies conducted in the literature to see whether or not 
social security affects personal and national savings: empirical studies and simulations.  
Empirical studies are based on three types of data sets and therefore might be classified 
accordingly:  time-series, cross-sectional, and cross-country analyses. 
This paper is the first attempt in the literature to investigate the saving effect of 
public social security in a time-series setting for a developing country, Turkey.  One reason 
for this scarcity of studies might be the limited availability of data for developing countries.  
Even though Turkey is not immune to this sort of problem, it has relatively better data 
sources and a long history with a public social security system.  Another reason could be 
the difficulty in calculating a proxy that represents an aggregate perception of household 
social security wealth.  
The first step in time-series studies is to calculate the total (aggregated) Social 
Security Wealth (SSW) series over the years for the economy.  SSW is the net present 
value of the future benefits and contributions with survival probabilities.  Since it’s a highly 
concentrated work, we have constructed the SSW series for Turkey from 1970 to 2003 in a 
separate study (Author, 2005).  A simple comparison shows that SSW is the largest part of 
the total household wealth in Turkey. 
A typical aggregate time-series study tests whether, as total SSW changes over 
time, aggregate saving also changes.  Some studies observe changes in consumption, while 
others look directly at saving.  The present study uses an aggregate consumption function 
in a life-cycle model (LCM) setting (Ando and Modigliani 1963) to investigate whether or 
not the time-series data provide some evidence for this claim. We extend the pure life-cycle 
consumption model to incorporate other factors that could influence aggregate 
consumption, such as uncertainty, credit constraints, unemployment, demographic changes 
and the interest rate.   
The most important aspect of this study is not only that Turkey is a developing 
country but also that it has one of the most generous social security systems in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) region.  Our 
estimation results show that SSW has significant and positive effects on consumption, and 
this could be interpreted as implying that public social security reduces saving in Turkey. 
 The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 1 provides a brief background on the 
relationship between saving and public social security and summarizes the time-series 
literature on the subject.  The generosity of the Turkish social security system is discussed 
in Section 2.  Section 3 discusses social security wealth in Turkey.   The model and results 
of the empirical tests are given in Section 4.  The conclusions are in Section 5.  The 
Appendix provides a brief summary of the SSW calculations for Turkey. 
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1. Background and Literature Review 
 
There are two major competing theories for testing whether or not social security or 
any type of government debt affects savings: the life-cycle model (Modigliani and 
Brumberg 1954) and the infinite-horizon model (Barro 1974).  Agents in the life-cycle 
model receive utility only from their own consumption and take the whole life-span into 
account when planning consumption.  They reduce their saving if their retirement is 
financed by levying taxes on the working generation. Whereas the Barro’s infinite-horizon 
model shows that when the life-cycle model is extended with altruistic bequest where 
agents receive utility from their descendants, saving might not be affected.     
The life-cycle hypothesis within a simple two-period overlapping generations 
setting provides a suitable framework for analyzing the effect of social security on saving 
where a rational forward-looking worker faces no borrowing constraints, capital market 
imperfections, and uncertainty.  If the worker has a constant labor supply and saves only 
for retirement, when a social security system is introduced, he dissaves exactly the same 
amount that he contributes to the system, provided that the implicit rate of return on the 
taxes (contributions) is equal to the market interest rate. In other words, if the combination 
of social security contributions and benefits does not alter the individual’s lifetime budget 
constraint, savings will fall by just enough to leave consumption during retirement 
unchanged. That is, he would substitute one asset for another, because social security and 
private saving are perfect substitutes. If the rate of return on the taxes is higher (lower) than 
the market interest rate, the worker dissaves more (less).3  If the social security system is 
unfunded, i.e., if most of the revenue from contributions goes directly to retirees as in 
PAYG, this reduction in personal saving is not offset by a rise in government saving, and, 
as a result, national saving falls. 
The simple model above assumes that people save only for retirement and do not 
receive and leave bequests in an environment where capital markets are perfect, the social 
security benefits are paid in lump sum, and there are no uncertainties in future income 
streams and life expectancies. Within the framework of a traditional life-cycle model, as we 
relax these assumptions, the provision of social security may not offset personal saving 
one-for-one even if the net social security wealth (NSSW) is zero as outlined below.   
• Uncertainty. People may not be so certain about their future income stream.  With 
uncertain earnings, households save more for precautionary motives relative to less 
urgent retirement saving in their early ages.  As income uncertainty increases, the 
negative effect of old-age pension entitlements on personal saving becomes 
stronger for older people who are close to retirement, but not so for younger 
population.  Thus the offset between social security and private saving tends to be 
less than one-for-one for younger households but increases as retirement saving 
becomes more important (Engen and Gale 1997).  
                                                 
3 If the implicit return on contributions (ssr) is equal to the market interest rate (r) then the present value 
of benefits is equal to present value of contributions, i.e. the net social security wealth (NSSW) zero, 
when the discounting occurs at the market interest rate.  If ssr > r NSSW becomes positive.  In this case, 
social security increases the lifetime budget constraint and consumption in each period would rise.  
Therefore, private saving would fall by more than the worker’s contribution. If NSSW is negative, the 
opposite occurs. Seidman (1999).  
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• Capital markets. If financial markets are not well developed, people cannot smooth 
their consumption by borrowing against their future income.  This may increase the 
need for precautionary saving.  As precautionary savings become more important 
for short-term income risks, the effect of social security provisions on personal 
savings fades.  Likewise, families may have fixed saving goals such as a down-
payment for a house.  With capital market constraints, they may be forced to reduce 
their consumption in response to social security payments, which in turn prevents 
personal saving from falling one-for-one.   
• Annuity payments.  Benefits are received by annuities not in a lump sum payment at 
retirement. Annuity payments may not finance unexpected large expenses and 
cannot be bequeathed to heirs. Therefore social security wealth itself may not be 
compatible with other types of personal wealth and thus social security 
contributions may not crowd out personal saving one-for-one.  
• Other saving motives.  The effect of social security contributions on personal saving 
depends on the substitutability of personal saving and social security contributions.   
If households save primarily as a precaution, they will consider social security 
contributions illiquid since benefit payments will not start before retirement.  
Therefore, social security will not replace personal saving one-for-one. 
• Insurance.  Moreover, since annuities provide insurance against the risk of 
uncertainty about longevity and personal saving cannot offset the insurance part of 
social security contributions, one might argue that the existence of social security 
could magnify a reduction in personal saving.4 
• Retirement effect.  When we allow households to vary the amount of labor supply 
supplied, consumption could be substituted by leisure.  As explained in the 
Feldstein’s influential paper (1974), when social security is introduced, individuals 
may reduce their retirement age.  This reduction in turn decreases the lifetime 
wealth by shortening the earning stream. Therefore, social security induces early 
retirement and increases personal saving during working years in order to finance 
longer retirement financial needs.  This offsetting retirement effect reduces the 
power of the asset substitution effect.  It is, therefore, theoretically possible that 
personal saving may even rise if the existing social security system induces a very 
early retirement age.   
• Partial equilibrium.  In addition to these partial equilibrium effects, there are 
general equilibrium effects as well.  A reduction in saving may cause a lower 
capital accumulation and in turn may reduce real wages.  A reduction in wages, in 
turn, may result in a decrease in consumption and an increase in saving.  Therefore, 
as Siedman (1984) shows, general equilibrium effects may dampen effects of social 
security on saving. 
• Attached benefits.  Social security wealth calculations ignore attached benefits such 
as health insurance and unemployment benefits. All these additional benefits can 
make the social security effects on personal saving stronger.  
 
                                                 
4 This type of insurance is less available in the private sector due to the adverse selection problem.  
Empirical studies show clear evidence that there is indeed an adverse selection problem in voluntary 
annuity markets (Finkelstein and Poterba (2004)). 
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Cultural factors, lack of urbanization (Novos 1989), inefficient social development, 
and an uneducated population would make a big difference in expected rational behaviors, 
which are supposed to be consistent with the life-cycle theory.  Furthermore, there is a 
tension between the justifications for a compulsory social security system and the 
justification for why social security affects saving: social security (public social saving 
systems) exists because people are myopic and cannot plan and save for their future.  
However, social security systems affect personal saving because people are foresighted and 
adjust their consumption and saving behaviors due to future social security changes.  As a 
result, it is theoretically ambiguous whether future social security entitlements negatively 
affect saving. 
In the literature, empirical studies that study social security effects on savings are 
based on three different types of data sets and might be classified accordingly:  cross-
section, time-series, and cross-country analyses. While cross-section researches analyze 
whether people with relatively high expectations in social security benefits hold relatively 
low private wealth, time-series analyses calculate the SSW series for the entire economy 
and then use it to see whether or not the aggregate consumption over time is higher as the 
SSW gets higher. Cross-country analyses compare different countries to see if the saving 
rate is linked to the generosity of public social security provisions.  
 The first time-series analysis was done by Feldstein in 1974.  He adopts the 
consumption function used by Ando and Modigliani (1963) and extends it by adding his 
new SSW variable.  In both of his studies in 1974 and 1996, Feldstein found statistically 
significant results showing that SSW affects consumption positively.  In his influential 
1974 paper, he claims that the social security provision reduces personal saving by 30% to 
50% in the US; while in 1996 he finds that the effect is almost 60%. 
Many time-series studies were done following Feldstien (1974).5   Among the most 
important studies on time-series analyses are the following. Munell (1974) looks at the 
same issue with endogenous retirement age and finds that a negative effect of benefits on 
saving is canceled out by a positive effect of early retirement. Darby (1979) uses the money 
supply and relative price of durables goods in his regression and finds negative effect in 
most cases. Coates and Humphreys (1999) investigate the linearity of the equation in 
Feldstein’s (1996) paper. Meguire (1998) disaggregates the personal disposable income by 
using Kormandi’s (1983) augmented consolidated approach and confirms Feldstein’s 
(1996) results. Finally, Blake (2004) uses error correction models and finds that state 
pensions have a strong saving replacement effect in the UK.   A more inclusive list for the 
literature on time-series studies is given in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 For an extensive literature review on the subject see OECD (1998), Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
memorandum (1998), Engen, E. and Gale, W. (1997), and Magnussen (1994).  
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Table 1: Time-Series Studies 
                   SSW 
Authors - Country          Sample Period        Dependent Variable        Coefficient 
Feldstein (1974) USA   1930-71   Consumption  S 
Munnell (1974) USA   1929-69   Personal Savings  S 
Barro (1978) USA   1929-74   Consumption  NS 
Darby (1979) USA    1924-74   Consumption  NS 
Markowski and Palmer (1979) Sweden 1952-75   Pers. Saving/Income S 
Boyle and Murrey (1979) Canada  1946-75   Pers. Saving  NS 
Pfaff, Hurler, Dennerlein (1979) Germany 1965-78   Pers. Saving/Income NS 
Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) USA  1930-74   Consumption  NS 
Browning (1982) UK   1966-79 (Quarterly) Consumption  S 
Lee and Chao (1988) USA  1947-77   Pers. Saving & LFPR NS 
Magnussen (1994) Norway  1966-90   Consumption  NS 
Rossi & Visco (1995) Italy  1954-93   Consumption  S 
Feldstein (1996) USA   1930-92   Consumption  S 
Meguire (1998) USA   1930-92   Consumption  S 
Coates and Humphreys (1999) USA 1930-92   Consumption  S  
Blake (2004) UK    1948-94   Consumption  S 
 
Notes: S and NS denote Significant and Not Significant respectively  
  
Three important criticisms of Feldstein’s 1974 paper are Barro (1978), Leimer 
and Lesnoy (1982), and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983).  The negative effect of funding 
structure of a social security program on national saving has been challenged by Barro 
(1974, 1989).  Unlike the life-cycle model, the Barro’s infinite-horizon model assumes 
that agents are altruistic and care about descendant’s consumption as well. Barro claims 
that the mandatory transfers from young to old could be offset by voluntary transfers 
from old to young under altruistic bequest motives and therefore funding status does 
not affect national saving.  Barro uses the same SSW data series with three additional 
major variables: unemployment, government deficit (or surplus), and a new SSW6 
variable in addition to Feldstein’s SSW.  He concludes that when the new variables are 
included the SSW coefficient becomes statistically insignificant.  Barro grounds this 
result on two factors: intergenerational transfers offset the fall in saving, and an inept 
representation of the perception of people by Feldstein’s SSW due to aggregation 
problems.7   
The main criticism of Feldstein’s paper came from Leimer and Lesnoy (1982).  
They find that the effect is insignificant when they use different methods for the 
formation of expectations in the perception of benefits.  Their criticism can be 
summarized in three points.  First, the regression results are very sensitive to the time 
frame. Second, small adjustments in the SSW calculation make a big difference in its 
coefficient.  Third, the expectation formation method for the perception of benefits and 
taxes that Feldstein used is highly speculative.8
                                                 
6 Barro’s alternative measure of social security is calculated based on current benefit rates and current 
worker coverage under social security. 
7 See Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) and Seidman (1984).  
8 Feldstein replies both Barro’s (1978) and Leimer and Lesnoy’s (1982) criticisms in Feldstein (1976a, 
1976b, 1978 and 1982) 
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Finally, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983), in a simulation, show that time-series 
coefficients are not stable because of the aggregation problems. They argue that the 
coefficients of a life-cycle consumption function depend on the individual’s age and 
differ at any point in time.  Therefore, if the age structure of a population is not stable, 
aggregation of individual consumption functions over all households may cause 
unstable coefficients. 
 
2. The Turkish Public Social Security System 
 
The framework for old-age security in Turkey, as in most developing countries, 
traditionally involves state-managed pension schemes that pay an earning-related 
defined benefit financed on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. Turkey’s social security 
system consists of three distinct institutions—Social Insurance Institution (Sosyal 
Sigortalar Kurumu - SSK) for wage earners in private and public sectors, Bag-Kur  
(BK) for self-employed individuals and farmers, and Retirment Fund (Emekli Sandigi - 
ES) for civil servants—covering different areas of the labor market. 
As most PAYG systems in the world, Turkey’s PAYG system have created 
significant fiscal deficits, labor market distortions, and wicked redistribution to higher 
income groups, without providing adequate income security for the old.  The populist 
social security policies of Turkish governments over the years have impaired the 
system whose total deficit approached 4.5% of GNP per year in 2004.  Between 1990 
and 2003, the present value of the total resources used to finance the deficit of the 
social security system is almost equal to the total GNP created by Turkey in 2003.9   
The financial problem of the Turkey’s social security system is resulted from 
both decreasing revenues and increasing expenses.  The lack of a minimum retirement 
age, which had been removed in 1992, has been the major factor for the financial 
imbalance—Turkey had retirement ages as young as 47 years of age in SSK and 48 
years of age in ES, the lowest in the world.10  Moreover, Turkey is the only country in 
the world that simultaneously had very low minimum contribution periods (in some 
cases as low as 10 years) and high replacement rates (90% in SSK, 127% in Bag-Kur, 
and 106% in ES)11 with a lack of minimum retirement age before the 1999 reform (The 
World Bank Country Economic Memorandum, 2000).  
The weak link12 between contributions and benefits before 1999 created an 
incentive for workers to declare the earnings base for premium at a lower value.   The 
high informal employment due to relatively high statutory contribution rates, the lack of 
automatic indexation of the contribution ceiling13 under high inflation conditions, and 
the low premium collection rates because of administrative inefficiencies worsened the 
already financially imbalanced system. As a result, the system became a major fiscal 
                                                 
9 “Proposal for Reform in the Social Security System” (2004), Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
10 Minimum ages were very low even before 1999.  The average minimum retirement ages 
for OECD countries are 64.4 for men and 63.9 for women in 2002 (OECD 2005). 
11 These rates reflects 2004 values and taken from “Proposal for Reform in the Social Security System” 
(2004), Ministry of Labor and Social Security. P.19 
12In SSK, pensions were linked to wages paid in the last five years and the same link was even worse in 
ES and Bag-Kur: only the last year’s wages were used to calculate pensions.  
13 The ceiling on wages subject to social security contribution in the fall of 1995 actually fell below the 
minimum wage. 
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burden, damaging Turkey’s macroeconomic stability. Coupled with other structural 
problems in the economy, the severe financial crisis early in 1999 forced Turkish 
government led by the World Bank to reform the impaired social security system in 
August 1999. This “parametric” reform was intended to achieve the actuarial balance of 
the PAYG system in the mid-term and to reduce pressure on the borrowing needs of the 
government.   
In summary, the most fundamental characteristics of the Turkish social security 
system have been its generosity (relative to income) due to very young average 
retirement ages (in some cases 38 for women and 47 for men14), low minimum 
contribution periods, and high replacement rates.  As seen in Table 2 below, according 
to a new research by the OECD (2005), a new entrant in Turkey has $74,000 average 
gross pension wealth with $2,510 per capita gross national income, while the same 
numbers are $183,000 and $35,430 for the US in 2002. In addition, Turkey’s gross 
replacement rate (87.2%) is the highest in the OECD region, which has 56.7% of the 
same rate as an average.15 While this generosity has paved the way for the collapse of 
the system’s actuarial and financial soundness and still presents a big problem for the 
system’s sustainability, one would expect that this generosity would also have strong 
effects on consumption and saving behaviors of individuals, which in turn may 
influence macro economic dynamics. It is this generosity that makes the Turkish case 
special relative to other developing countries in the literature.  
 
Table 2: Pension and Income (2002, in US Dollars) 
     Gross Relative Relative 
  Per Capita Average Replacement Pension Pension Pension 
  GNI Wage Rate Wealth Wealth Level
 Hungary   5,100 4,187 7
4 7
4 6
3 4
5 7
8
3 5
5
4 6
5 8
                                                
5.4 55,000 11.7 72.2 
 Slovak Republic   4,080 3,031 8.6 27,000 .9 47.9 
 Czech Republic   5,880 6,306 4.4 47,000 .9 41.7 
 Mexico    5,950 6,180 6.0 28,000 .5 35.7 
 Poland    4,680 6,456 6.9 51,000 .7 55.5 
 Turkey    2,510 6,571 7.2 74,000 10.3 81.3 
 United Kingdom   25,560 29,133 7.1 172,000 .5 37.1 
 United States   35,430 32,360 38.6 183,000 .2 36.5 
 Canada   22,610 24,756 2.5 163,000 .1 39.9 
 OECD Average     6.9 202,367 .7 55.4 
 
Notes: Except GNI, the others are taken form OECD (2005). Average Wage: the average annual earning 
for a production worker. Replacement Rate (men): a pension entitlement (first annuity) as a share of 
individual’s last earning.  Gross Pension Wealth (average): the discounted stream of future pension 
payments for a new entrant in 2002.  Relative Pension Level (men): the weighted average of the pension 
entitlements (first annuity) expressed as a percentage of economy-wide average earnings.  Relative 
Pension Wealth (men): the weighted average of pension wealth as a multiple of economy-wide average 
earnings.  Gross National Income, GNI, is taken from WDI (The World Bank).  
 
 
 
14 See “Turk Emeklilik Sisteminde Reform” (The Reform in Turkish Pension System) TUSIAD November 
2004 P.108 
15 Excluding Luxemburg which is an outlier with 101.9% gross replacement rate. 
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3. Social Security Wealth Series for Turkey 
 
The heart of the time-series analyses is the calculation of the aggregate social 
security wealth (SSW) variable.  In a life-cycle setting, the future income should 
include both pensions and labor income.  Since pension annuities are received only by 
retirees, the rest of the population should form expectations for the future pension 
entitlements based on their labor income and related social security regulations.    
The social security wealth (SSW) is one of the calculations, as a proxy for 
expected benefits, for measuring the effect of social security on consumption.  This 
proxy represents people’s perception of social security benefits that they will have in 
the future.   
The aggregate SSW, which is basically the net aggregate present value of future 
social security annuities and tax liabilities with survival probabilities anticipated by 
people, was conceptualized and calculated for the first time by Feldstein in his (1974) 
paper. 
We applied the same methodology used in Feldsetein (1974) paper and 
calculated the SSW series for 34 years from 1970 to 2003 at 1987 prices for Turkey in a 
separate study (Author 2005).  We choose this period since the data about the 
demographics of labor market are not readily available for earlier years. The detailed 
information about the construction of SSW series can be found in Author (2005) and a 
brief summary is given in the Appendix. 
In order to calculate the SSW series, a “reference income” is needed at two 
points: in the calculation of benefit and tax factors and in the calculation of the first 
annuities.  Since there is no “survey” based “Personal Disposable Income” (PDI) series 
in Turkey, We have used Net Private Disposable Income (NprvDI) series generated 
from the national accounts.  
We have fist attempted to generate PDI by using national account identities: 
PDI ~ª NNP – TX + TR – RE + NINT16.  However, because of the problems in finding 
reliable information on the components of PDI above, We use NPrvDI instead.  The 
difference between NprvDI and PDI, as shown below, simply is retained earnings (RE), 
on which we don’t have any data for Turkey. 
If we subtract taxes (TX) and add transfers (TR) and net interest payments by 
government (NINT) from and to both sides of a simple textbook version of the national 
account identity, we get the following: 
                                                 
16 Net National Product (NNP) = GNP – Depreciation 
Net Income (NI) = NNP – Indirect Taxes (InTX) + Subsidies 
PDI = NI – (Corporate Profits-Corporate Dividends) + Net Interest (NINT) + (Transfers (TR)-
Contribution to Social Security (SS)) – Personal Taxes (PrsTX) 
Since (Corporate Profits-Corporate Dividends) = (Corporate Taxes (CorpTX)–Retained Earnings (RE)) 
PDI = NI – (CorpTX + RE) + NINT + TR - SSTX – PrsTX 
PDI = NNP – (IndTX + Subsidies) – (CorpTX + RE) + NINT + TR - SSTX – PrsTX 
If we group taxes then 
PDI = NNP- (IndTX + CorpTX + SSTX + PrsTX) + TR + NINT -RE 
Since the first parenthesis on the right hand side is simply TX  (Taxes) we can generate the following 
identity for national account: 
PDI ~∫ NNP – TX + TR – RE + NINT.  A similar method is used by Meguire (1998) and he finds that 
the difference between the “generated” PDI and survey based PDI is statistically insignificant for the US. 
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GNP – TX + TR + NINT = C + I - (TX – G – TR - NINT) + (NX + NFI)17
 
The expression on the left hand side is Gross Private Disposable Income (GprvDI), and 
the first and second parentheses on the right side are government saving (GS) and 
foreign sources (FS) respectively.  Therefore the above identity becomes 
 
GPrvDI = C + I – GS + FS18
 
If the consumption of capital (CoC) is subtracted from both sides, we get 
 
NPrvDI = NNP – TX + TR + NINT  
 
As seen from this identity, the difference between NprvDI and PDI is RE.  Therefore, 
as long as individuals perceive undistributed profits as capital gains (hence a part of 
their income), the difference between NprvDI and PDI could be insignificant19.  We 
use the following NprvDI definition as reference income series in the SSW calculations 
and regressions20.  
 
NprvDI = C + I – GS + FS - CoC 
 
We have generated several different SSW series by using alternative 
assumptions and parameters.  First of all, as explained in the Appendix, we apply three 
different types of expectation method in the formation of SSW series.  In addition to 
that, we use two different discount rates: 3% and 5%.  We found the growth rate for the 
per capita NprvDI to be 1.88%, so we use 2% income growth rate for the 34-year 
period.  Finally, we assume that annuities after retirement can grow either by 2% (same 
as income) or remain the same so that the nominal increase can be as much as the price 
inflation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 GNP, Gross National Product; C, Consumption; I, Investment; G, Government Expenditures; NX, Net 
Export; NFI, Net Factor Income from the rest of the world.   
18 GprvDI is also calculated by the State Planning Organization (SPO) in Turkey since 1987, using similar 
methods, in a table called as  “General Macro Balance of the Economy”,. 
19 See Feldstein (1974), Ando and Modigliani (1963) and Barro (1978). 
20 The consumption, investment and consumption of capital series are taken from OECD database, GS is 
from State Planning Organization (SPO) and FS is from SPO and World Development Indicators (WDI – 
from the World Bank). 
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Table 3: Total Wealth in Financial Assets, Housing and SSW with NPrvDI 
(Million TL in 1987 Prices) 
 TFA Housing SSWG SSWN NPrvDI 
1970            7,588,518      32,700,333      54,350,527     43,721,351     25,592,525  
1975          10,806,548      41,781,557      89,508,490     69,086,105     33,269,315  
1980            9,674,345      56,696,805      63,905,043     33,945,697     42,029,239  
1985          20,075,898      63,750,469      62,728,296     24,296,819     45,873,753  
1990          26,996,582      88,709,913    111,574,201     65,316,832     67,179,895  
1995          46,704,601    128,391,319    103,123,054     49,536,263     84,157,732  
1996          61,819,289    135,536,058    171,916,203   119,046,643     86,040,622  
1997          69,998,934    152,101,623    231,487,100   160,536,942     92,590,536  
1998          75,985,989    160,030,906    277,262,042   185,039,302   102,044,735  
1999          96,063,696    159,652,714    292,422,907   198,503,687   102,748,644  
2000          95,036,365    159,160,494    276,903,910   185,179,981   103,808,861  
2001        146,103,010    165,728,972    270,810,987   198,497,777   100,472,296  
2002        126,833,322    158,074,788    297,929,986   236,761,695     98,286,544  
2003        117,491,297    166,061,466    342,736,721   283,310,716   105,211,662  
 
Notes: SSW series are calculated by 3% discount rate, 2% growth rate (income) with the “current 
benefit factor” method. Total Financial Assets (TFA) is calculated by Turkish State Planning 
Organization (SPO) for the entire economy regardless of who holds them. Housing wealth is an 
approximation (Author, 2005). 
 
The most important thing to observe is the magnitude of the SSW series relative 
to NPrvDI and other wealth measures.  This fact can be seen in Table 2 above.  This 
observation supports the argument that the social security wealth variable could be an 
important determinant in saving and consumption studies.  This result is also consistent 
with the U.S social security wealth series done by Feldstein (1974) and Leimer and 
Lesnoy (1982). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
As mentioned before, we use an aggregate consumption function in a pure Life-
Cycle model setting as a baseline model to investigate whether or not the time-series 
data provide some evidence for the claim that an unfunded social security system has 
positive effects on consumption, and thus, negative effects on saving.  We also extend 
the model to incorporate other factors, which possibly influence aggregate 
consumption, such as uncertainty, unemployment, demographic changes, interest rate, 
and borrowing constraints. 
 
4.1 The Model and Data 
A rational, forward-looking Household (HH), with inelastic labor supply, 
maximizes its following lifetime utility subject to its lifetime budget constraint in a 
perfect capital market without uncertainty: 
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T is the age of death and i is the age of household.  For example, if the individual is 25 
years old and T is 85, then the maximum life duration for the individual is T-i=60.  C 
denotes consumption and W is real wealth, which is directly observable and consists of 
housing wealth and financial assets.  SSW is discounted present value of future benefits 
with survival probabilities for every household.  The retirement age is given by the law 
and the maximum life (T) might be truncated at 85. 
HW is human wealth and not directly observable.  It’s the present value of 
current and future labor incomes.  Since it includes social security taxes, SSW may be 
taken as gross. 
 
The solution for this maximization problem is 
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Since we further assume that the personal discount rate, r, is equal to the real interest 
rate, r, d drops out.  When we aggregate this individual solution over all households, 
the resulting function can be represented by the following average (aggregate) 
consumption function for the entire economy.21  
 
tt
e
tt SSWWYC 4310 ββββ +++=    
 
C represents consumption expenditures for households,  is the present value of 
current and expected future income, W is the non-human household wealth and SSW is 
the social security wealth.   
eY
We start the empirical test with the above baseline aggregate consumption, 
which is used in Feldstein’s studies both in 1974 and in 1996.    In this application, the 
consumption expenditures include durable goods for the entire period between 1970 
and 2003.  This is because there is no information on the disaggregated household 
consumption prior to 1987.  Since we estimate only long-term dynamics between the 
consumption and other variables by the equation above, the inclusion of durable goods 
in the consumption expenditures does not present a problem.22   “Income”, Y, was first 
defined in Modigliani’s LCT study in 1963 as “labor income”.  However, because of 
                                                 
21 See Ando and Modigliani (1963) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983). 
22 See Mehra (2001). 
 12
the difficulties involved in calculating implicit labor income for self-employed people, 
“personal disposable income” (PDI) has been used as an alternative measure in later 
consumption studies23. We use Net Private Disposable Income (NprvDI) in the 
regressions in the absence of survey based PDI in Turkey. Nevertheless, PDI or NPrvDI 
is not a perfect measure for LCM: they both include non-human incomes and transfers, 
and therefore, constitute double counting. Since the expected future income is not 
directly observable, we use the following rational expectation method in which the 
current income is unknown and equal to the expectation of current income and a 
forecast error (ε ) with the standard assumptions NIID~(0,1), as expressed below.  
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Households form their expectations at time t by using the available information (I) at 
time t-1 and it is assumed that expected future income is proportional to expected 
current income24. 
There is no ready-to-use wealth series for households in Turkey, and we have a 
range of problems in estimating both financial and housing wealth for households.  In 
private equity markets, for example, the first stock exchange, ISE, was formed in 1986. 
Likewise, private pension funds are very new and not significant.  Since the free float in 
the Turkish market is significantly lower than 30%25 (of the total outstanding equity), 
the market capitalization is not an appropriate indicator for measuring the private equity 
market even for the entire economy.   Besides, the share of foreign investors in the 
market is very high (approximately 50%) and the available information about the 
household holdings in stocks is very limited. 
Before 1980, since the interest rates on deposits were not free, they are not able 
to reflect the “true” nominal rates under the conditions of high inflation and political 
instability.   Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that the wealth was held mostly 
in gold and housing by households before the liberalizations of the financial markets 
(during the early 1980s).  Since there are no available data, estimating gold holdings of 
household is quite speculative for Turkey. 
Moreover, after 1988, increasing needs in government borrowings made 
government bonds one of the most demanded investment means for domestic investors.  
However, since new accounting standards were put into effect in the banking sector 
only after 2001, there is no reliable record for households’ holdings in government 
bonds prior to that year. 
The only adequate data among the household financial assets are on bank 
deposits, which is the most common financial investment tool for ordinary households 
particularly prior to 1990s.  Therefore, we use the most common proxy for the financial 
wealth used in the aggregate time-series consumption and saving investigations for 
Turkey26: real money balances measured by Money-Quasi money (M2). 
                                                 
23 See Blinder et al. (1985), Darby (1979), Feldstein (1974 and 1996), Modigliani (1983). 
24 See Ando and Modigliani (1963) and Mehra (2001). 
25 The World Bank Country Report (2003) 
26 See Akkoyunlu (2002), Ozcan et al. (2003) 
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The second and most important part of household wealth is housing.  The 
shallow financial markets (particularly before the liberalization in the early 1980s), 
high inflation and political instability made housing the most popular investment tool 
for households in Turkey.   However, the available data on the number of existing 
dwelling units and their values are very limited. The only available data for each year 
on housing are the number of occupancy permits for each dwelling unit and their 
values.  The total stock of dwelling units for each year between 1970 and 2003 can be 
estimated if the initial stock is known in 1970 and illegal constructions are ignored for 
the entire period in question.  Even though the high urbanization cast doubts on this 
assumption, we use the relevant data from the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) as 
checkpoints in generating an approximation of the stock of dwelling units27.   
In the life-cycle theory, non-human wealth, which is a part of total lifetime 
resources, contributes to consumption by its anticipated “purchasing power”.  This 
purchasing power is divisible into two parts: the additional income that wealth earns 
and the consumption of this wealth itself (Hamburger 1955). In an economy with 
superficial financial markets (without mortgage markets) and high bequest motives, the 
second part of the purchasing power of housing wealth, i.e., the consumption of 
housing wealth itself, could be considered weak relative to that of more developed 
economies. Therefore, property incomes might be a better proxy for housing wealth 
than the total value of the dwelling units in measuring the anticipated “purchasing 
power” of the housing wealth.  Therefore, instead of using an “approximated” total 
value of dwellings as a proxy for housing wealth, we use “Ownership of Dwellings”28, 
which consists of direct and imputed incomes (net of inputs, representing the added 
value) of owners from their dwellings. 
The baseline consumption function, Equation (2), omits potentially important 
factors that may influence consumption behaviors: credit constraints, demographic 
trends, uncertainty, the separation of non-human wealth in terms of liquidity, and the 
real interest rate.  Therefore, we extend this baseline consumption function as follows 
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where HW denotes the housing wealth using “Ownership from Dwellings”, FW is 
financial wealth, which is proxied by the Money-Quasi Money (M2), and CRPT is 
“credit to private sector” representing the credit constraints. Inf is unexpected inflation, 
as a proxy for uncertainty, calculated by the difference between the current and 3-year 
moving average consumer price inflation. 
The real interest rate, R, is calculated by adjusting nominal interest rates on one-
year time deposit accounts29. While R has two well-known effects on consumption, 
substitution and income, it has a special importance in our case: all coefficients are 
affected by a common factor, the real interest rate, as seen in Equation (1).    
                                                 
27 See Author(2005) 
28 It’s from the National Accounts by Production, State Institute of Statistics (SIS).  
29 ⎟⎟⎠
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, where i denotes nominal rates, and π  is the consumer price inflation. 
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Demographic variables have important roles in the life-cycle consumption 
models.  The stability of averaged coefficients in Equation (2) depends on how quickly 
the demographic changes occur.  Besides, according to LCM, while the young and 
elderly consume more relative to their income, working age people are supposed to 
save more and consume less30.  We use Old and Young as dependency ratios, which are 
the ratios of the number of people (people younger than 15 and older than 64) to the 
working-age population (those ages 15-64), to see if their effects are different.  Another 
demographic variable, the ratio of urban population to the total population denoted by 
Urban, could also be an important factor: a higher urbanization could lead to a decrease 
in precautionary saving, and therefore a higher consumption could be expected. 
Unemployment rate, Un, is used by Ando and Modigliani (1963) as a part of 
permanent income.  As Barro (1978) indicates, it would have a positive effect on 
current consumption, if future income were positively related to the unemployment rate 
given the value of current income and other factors.  In other words, according to LCM, 
when people are unemployed, they smooth their consumption by reducing their saving, 
since they could anticipate that the current income is below the permanent income.  On 
the other hand, a high unemployment rate, which is a common observation in most 
developing countries, might indicate uncertainty about the future income and therefore 
suppress consumption (Feldstein 1978). Its effect on consumption, therefore, is not 
necessarily positive. 
The labor force participation rate, LFPR, is supposed to affect the relationship 
between consumption and social security wealth: as the SSW increases it may push 
consumption up.  However, a higher SSW can create downward pressure on LFPR and 
this may pull consumption down.  
 
4.2 Estimations 
As pointed in several time-series aggregate consumption studies31, the consumption 
equations, which are linear in levels, may suffer from heteroskedasticity, with or 
without unit roots, simply because of economic growth that causes the residual variance 
to increase with time. Feldstein (1974, 1996) applies linear models in levels.  Meguire 
(1998) criticizes this approach by pointing out that “neither logged nor weighted” 
(p.342) time-series linear models in levels may have heteroskedasticity problems, 
which should be corrected. He uses weighted series by the lagged level of dependent 
variable in his models.  Coates et al. (1999) refer to the same problem in their 
investigation of social security and prefer to apply models linear in levels.  We also test 
for heteroskedasticity in all estimations, which are linear in levels, by the White test.  
We then decided to use levels.  The first results are given in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30See Modigliani (1986), Darby (1979).  
31 See Mehra (2001), Coates and Humphreys (1999), Campell and Mankiw (1989), Meguire (1998). 
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Figure 1: Estimation Results with SSWG 
Equations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        
Income 0.62683 0.52183 0.59112 0.41034 0.30530 0.28483 0.16886 
 0.05022 0.08141 0.071569 0.11616 0.07512 0.06942 0.07947 
SSWG 0.00385 0.01913 0.02114 0.01256 0.01222 0.01917 0.02346 
 0.00879 0.01219 0.010564 0.01081 0.00845 0.00827 0.00879 
HW 1.95662 1.66721 2.45531 0.62445 1.41514 1.55203 1.27313 
 0.45026 0.60926 0.427775 0.88683 0.35125 0.32706 0.35279 
FW (0.05544) (0.18854) (0.22163) (0.23044) (0.14375) (0.17374) (0.18193) 
 0.07163 0.08842 0.07057 0.11091 0.06603 0.06181 0.06520 
R - - - (102,348.10) (119,396.40) (110,872.60) (135,338.50)
    71,917.01 43,173.77 39,755.31 42,421.80 
CRTP - - - 0.33059 0.47303 0.47787 0.55697 
    0.13601 0.09655 0.08858 0.09575 
Inf - - - (185.50)  - - 
    447.89    
Old - - - (143,050.20)  - - 
    109,456.40    
Young - - - (36,754.32)  - - 
    23,516.29    
LFPR - - - 8,932.35  - - 
    5,695.40    
Un - - - (627,799.90)  - - 
    608,390.20    
Urban - - - (20,737.49)  - - 
    14,950.77    
Time - 4,081.28 3,457.18 22,370.24 7,539.39 8,054.35 10,521.57 
  2,752.08 2,153.01 11,557.03 1,901.79 1,757.21 1,966.36 
Dummy95 - 44,884.28 42,615.37 - - 53,414.29 57,871.49 
  24,816.18 18,034.58   21,982.47 23,207.58 
Constant 146,748.80 236,464.60 123,574.00 2,701,405.00 321,834.10 320,572.00 402,502.20 
 60,249.83 78,831.86 66,485.42 1,740,420.00 60,892.92 55,855.17 62,823.22 
AR(1) Rho - 0.51454 0.74580 - - - - 
  0.20631 0.171172     
AR(2) Rho - - (0.60402) - - - - 
   0.18203     
DW 1.14370 1.53819 1.79157 2.29047 1.96714 1.86096 2.13010 
R2 0.96475 0.97194 0.97732 0.98108 0.98171 0.98461 0.98289 
SSR 25.1E+9 16.2E+9 11.5E+9 9.3E+9 11.7E+9 9.5E+9 10.5E+9 
W 0.04213 0.09371 0.73767 0.65525 0.12718 0.45301 0.36136 
LM - 0.01186 0.56409 - - - - 
 
All variables are deflated to 1987 prices32 and divided by population. SSW 
series are gross and calculated by 2% income growth and 3% discount rates.  The 
benefit factors and coverage ratios used in SSW calculations are not average (constant) 
and change every year.  Standard errors are presented below the coefficients.  R2 is 
adjusted R2.  SSR denotes the sum of squared residuals and negative numbers are in 
                                                 
32 Except for the unexpected inflation, interest rate and all ratios.  By calculation, SSW series are per 
capita and in real terms. 
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parentheses 
We use a dummy variable, Dummy95, to take care of the outlier33 in 1995, 
which is identified by observing the recursive residuals.34  We also applied a dummy 
variable for economic recessions and found that it’s statistically insignificant. 
The first equation is without a correction for its apparent autocorrelation 
problem. The series in Equations 2 are transformed by the first-degree autoregressive 
AR(1) process.35  We suspect that the specification of autocorrelation might be different 
than the AR(1) process.  Even though it is not possible to know the exact form of 
autocorrelation, we add AR(2) to equation 2 and obtain the results in equations 3. When 
the series are transformed by the AR(1) procedure, the first observations are lost.  
Therefore we also applied Prais-Winsten transformation (with AR(1) scheme) to save 
the first observations.  We found insignificant differences in the coefficients with and 
without the first observations, and therefore the results are not presented here.  In 
equation 4, we use the full scale of variables.  
Since the DW statistic is not strictly applicable with autoregressive 
transformations, we also use the Breusch-Godfrey test to diagnose a possible 
autocorrelation, which is presented by the probability that there is no first-degree 
autocorrelation and denoted by LM in Figure 1 above36. The results of White test37 — 
the probabilities that the estimations don’t suffer from heteroskedasticity — are shown 
next to W. 
As seen in Equations 4, except for CRTP, the new variables do not contribute to 
the baseline consumption function defined in Equation (1) before.  Very low pair wise 
correlations show that their insignificances are not merely due to their collinearity with 
each other. In equations 5 and 6, we remove the insignificant new additional variables38 
and add the dummy variable in equation (6). 
Since income is defined as NprvDI = C + I – GS + FS – CoC, there might be a 
simultaneity problem.  Therefore, in equation 7, we use GS, FS and I as instrumental 
variables and apply two-stage least squares (TSLS).   This application improves the 
DW statistics as expected. 
The first observation of all equations shows that the SSW variable has a stable 
positive sign consistent with the model.  Even though equation 3 improves the 
significance of SSW, equations 1, 2 and 3 most likely suffer from possible specification 
problems. 
In equation 4, although not significant, the signs of demographic variables, 
                                                 
33 A severe economic crisis took place in 1994 with a 9-percent decrease in per capita real NprvDI.  In 
1995 it turned up with a 4-percent growth rate. 
34 We plotted the recursive residuals (for Equation 1 in Figure 5), i.e., one-step-ahead prediction errors  
(see Johnston and Dinardo. 1997. p. 118) about the zero line.  Residuals outside the two standard error 
bands are identified as outliers.  We have two outliers: 1987 and 1995.  However, a dummy for 1987 
turned out to be insignificant with very high probability.    
35 We assume that the error term follows the first-order autoregressive scheme in Equations 2 as follows: 
ttt ερμμ += −1  where ε is a white noise process. 
36 In computing LM statistics, we took the length of lags for residuals 1 with AR(1) and 2 for AR(2).  
37 Without cross terms 
38 We applied the Wald test and got very high p-values for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all 
removed variables are jointly zero, except R  
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Urban, Young and Old, contradict the model’s predictions.39 As pointed in Ozcan et al. 
(2003), this can be explained by the extended families under the poor economic and 
financial conditions in Turkey.  The increased number of dependent children and 
elderly may reduce family resources, increase the economic burden, and pull the 
consumption down. As for the urbanization, the rapid increase in the urban population 
makes the living conditions in cities worse for new comers.  Therefore, a high 
urbanization in a short time may create an additional income uncertainty with the effect 
of reducing consumption.     
The sign of the proxy for financial wealth, FW, does not agree with the model’s 
prediction in all regressions. However, there may be several reasons for this: the first 
reason could be that the M2 series may not be a good proxy for the financial wealth 
held by the private sector.  As explained earlier, after the financial liberalization in the 
markets, the money held by the private sector is mostly invested in short term 
government bonds. Another reason might be that M2 is also an indicator for the 
financial depth in an economy.  Therefore, an increase in M2 can trigger higher savings 
and therefore lower consumption40. Likewise, under the high inflation conditions, a 
higher expected inflation may reduce real interest rates (given inelastic nominal rates, 
which is especially true before the 1980s in Turkey) and therefore depress savings and 
draw consumption up41.  When the prices fall down (or a decrease in expected 
inflation), which increases the real money balance in the markets, people save more and 
consume less due to the increased real interest rates.  Thus, through the price levels, the 
real money balance could be negatively related to consumption. 
Housing Wealth (HW) variable, which is represented by the income from 
dwellings is statistically significant in all estimations, except for equation 4.  As 
explained before, this result is consistent with the fact that even though housing is the 
major investment tool for households, it’s mostly bequeathed in Turkey.  Therefore the 
imputed income from the housing wealth has a significant effect on consumption. 
As explained before, if people can borrow more against their future income and 
current illiquid assets, they have more sources to consume.  The significant relationship 
between consumption and CRTP confirms this argument.  Moreover, the real interest 
rate has a negative and significant sign, which shows that substitution effect overweighs 
the income effect.  Although insignificant, the sign of unexpected inflation agrees with 
the models prediction.  Likewise, the rate of unemployment is insignificant and 
negatively related to the consumption level, indicating that the future income 
uncertainty embedded in unemployment prevails under poor financial and economic 
conditions.        
Among the equations 5, 6 and 7 in Figure 1, equation 6 has better test measures 
relative to others in terms of R2 and SSR. Moreover, the inclusion of the dummy 
variable improves Akaike and Schwarz criterions.  Its DW statistics is 1.8609, which is 
slightly higher than the upper level (1.86; n=34, k=8 with 0.01 significance level). 
As Blinder et al. (1985) pointed, the important results should not be sensitive to 
the choice between linear and logarithmic forms.  Therefore, equation 6 is re-estimated 
                                                 
39 Akkoyunlu (2002) and Ozcan et.al (2003) find similar insignificant results for demographic variables in 
their consumption and saving studies for Turkey . 
40 Ozcan et al. (2003) find a significant positive effect of M2/GDP on private savings in Turkey  
41 Akkoyunlu (2002) indicates that inflation in Turkey has positive effects on consumption. 
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with the logarithmic transformation (except for real interest rate). As seen in Figure 2 
below, the SSW variable is statistically significant with 10% significance level. 
 
Figure 2: Estimation with Log Transformation 
Variable C Y SSWG HW FW R CRTP DUMMY95 Time 
Coefficient 7.4326 0.3156 0.0378 0.1154 (0.1450) (0.0928) 0.1448 0.0115 0.0487 
Std. Error 1.2565 0.0912 0.0191 0.0249 0.0419 0.0503 0.0287 0.0025 0.0240 
t-Statistic 5.9153 3.4617 1.9759 4.6416 (3.4576) (1.8446) 5.0476 4.6452 2.0319 
Prob.   0.0000 0.0019 0.0593 0.0001 0.0020 0.0770 0.0000 0.0001 0.0529 
Adjusted R-squared 0.98271 Durbin-Watson stat 1.763567     
Sum squared resid 1.13E-02 F-statistic  235.3797     
 
The SSW variable has a significant positive sign in equation (6), which 
confirms that the social security wealth has a positive effect on consumption, thus 
negative effect on saving. The results, in Figure 3 below, show that the net or gross 
definition of SSW does not alter the sign agreement and significance level of SSW. 
This result is also consistent with the notion that the future taxes are included in the 
expected future income and therefore the correct measure should be gross social 
security wealth, as indicated in Feldstein’s (1974, 1996) results. 
 
Figure 3: Estimation Results with SSWN 
Variable C Y SSWN HW FW R CRTP DUMMY95 Time 
Coefficient 300,004 0.3126 0.0165 1.6587 (0.1653) (112,334) 0.4949 49,561 7,688 
Std. Error 55,934 0.0675 0.0076 0.3392 0.0617 40,202 0.0900 21,814 1,721 
t-Statistic 5.3636 4.6293 2.1653 4.8893 (2.6783) (2.7943) 5.4999 2.2720 4.4667 
Prob.   0.0000 0.0001 0.0401 0.0000 0.0129 0.0098 0.0000 0.0320 0.0001 
          
 Adjusted R-squared   0.98425   Durbin-Watson stat           1.82     
 Sum squared resid  9.68E+09   F-statistic        258.81     
 
As pointed before, the SSW series are calculated with the “current factors” 
method and 3% discount rate in Figure 1. However, the regression results should be 
tested against these assumptions embedded in the SSW calculations. 
 
4.3 Tests of Assumptions 
As explained earlier, we used three alternative expectation methods in 
calculating the SSW series:  the average (constant), adaptive, and current benefit (and 
tax) factor methods. Since there are strong negative trends in both benefit and tax 
factors, we used only the adaptive and current factor methods.  The results in Figure 1, 
2 and 3 were found by the current benefit and tax methods.  Therefore, Figure 4 below 
shows only the adaptive expectation results. 
 
Figure 4: Estimation Results with Adaptive Expectations  
Variable C Y SSWG HW FW R CRTP DUMMY95 Time 
Coefficient 330,511 0.2706 0.0189 1.4512 (0.1655) (107,168) 0.5053 49405.3 8,243 
Std. Error 57,941 0.0740 0.0091 0.3321 0.0636 41,307 0.0912 22,008 1,889 
t-Statistic 5.7042 3.6564 2.0734 4.3697 (2.6035) (2.5944) 5.5390 2.2449 4.3628 
Prob.   0.0000 0.0012 0.0486 0.0002 0.0153 0.0156 0.0000 0.0339 0.0002 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.98404   Durbin-Watson stat  1.773714    
Sum squared resid 9.81E+09   F-statistic   255.373    
 
The other assumption is about the discount rate.  In Figure 5 below, the discount rate is 
changed from 3% to 5% and the SSW series are gross and calculated by both the 
current and adaptive expectations methods, denoted by (cr) and (ae) respectively. 
 
Figure 5: Estimation Results with 5% Discount Rate 
SSWG-cr C Y SSWG HW FW R CRTP DUMMY95 Time 
Coefficient 324,313 0.2837 0.0310 1.5474 (0.1819) (110,525) 0.4846 54,604 7,958 
Std. Error 55,581 0.0687 0.0128 0.3241 0.0626 39,364 0.0879 21,874 1,706 
t-Statistic 5.8350 4.1266 2.4281 4.7748 (2.9077) (2.8078) 5.5140 2.4963 4.6637 
Adjusted R-squared    0.9849 Durbin-Watson stat 1.872753     
Sum squared resid 9.30E+09 F-statistic  269.4626     
          
SSWG-ae C Y SSWG HW FW R CRTP DUMMY95 Time 
Coefficient 334,354 0.2688 0.0313 1.4527 (0.1767) (106,627) 0.5111 51,171 8,189 
Std. Error 57,518 0.0728 0.0141 0.3283 0.0645 40,674 0.0905 21,887 1,818 
t-Statistic 5.8130 3.6942 2.2285 4.4248 (2.7381) (2.6215) 5.6474 2.3380 4.5045 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9844 Durbin-Watson stat     1.7947     
Sum squared resid 9.59E+09 F-statistic  261.2627     
 
These results show that the sign and significance of the SSW variable are not sensitive 
to major assumptions.  The DW statistics are between the lower and upper limits (with 
0.01 significance), and therefore whether they have serial correlation problems is 
indeterminate.  However, as indicated before, they have a simultaneity problem tested 
by the Hausman method42.  When TSLS is used, the significance of SSW doesn’t 
change but DW improves as shown in equation 7 in Figure 1 
 
4.4 Alternative Proxies for Social Security 
Even though SSW, the present value of future social security entitlements with 
survival probabilities, is the best proxy for people’s perception of social security 
wealth, other alternative proxies can be used to test whether or not social security 
provisions affect consumption behaviors. 
We used two proxies for social security: per capita real old-age benefits (SSA1) 
and a variable (SSA2) that is similar to one used by Barro (1978).  This second proxy is 
calculated as a product of per retiree real old-age benefits, the cover ratio,43 and the 
total number of workers44.  The results are presented in Figure 6 below show that the 
provision of social security has positive and statistically significant45 effects on 
consumption.  
 
                                                 
42 The forecasted income and residuals are obtained by using the reduced form income equation, which 
includes instrumental variables.  When Equation 6 in Figure 1 was re-estimated with the forecasted 
income and residuals, I found that residuals are statistically significant with the t-value of 8.3. 
43 The cover ratio is the ratio of the number of workers covered by social security to the total employment. 
44 The data on employment is from SIS and Bulutay (1995). 
45 The second proxy is significant with 10% confidence level. 
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Figure 6: Estimation Results with Alternative Proxies 
Variable C Y SSA1 HW FW R CRTP DUMMY95 Time 
Coefficient 366,170 0.2856 1.5418 1.3328 (0.2204) (110,868) 0.5286 59,182 6,571 
Std. Error 56,721 0.0648 0.5205 0.3132 0.0649 37,299 0.0858 21,097 1,444 
t-Statistic 6.4557 4.4097 2.9623 4.2560 (3.3967) (2.9724) 6.1606 2.8052 4.5501 
Prob.   0.0000 0.0002 0.0066 0.0003 0.0023 0.0065 0.0000 0.0096 0.0001 
          
Adjusted R-squared    0.9862 Durbin-Watson stat     1.9077     
Sum squared resid 8.51E+09 F-statistic      294.87     
          
Variable C Y SSA2 HW FW R CRTP DUMMY95 Time 
Coefficient 306,470 0.2927 0.2720 1.5580 (0.1514) (112,062) 0.4705 48,716 8,301 
Std. Error 57,059 0.0716 0.1440 0.3382 0.0619 41,385 0.0914 22,347 1,988 
t-Statistic 5.3711 4.0867 1.8888 4.6067 (2.4470) (2.7078) 5.1470 2.1800 4.1743 
Prob.   0.0000 0.0004 0.0706 0.0001 0.0218 0.0120 0.0000 0.0389 0.0003 
          
Adjusted R-squared 0.98363 Durbin-Watson stat 1.808979     
Sum squared resid 1.01E+10 F-statistic  248.9205     
  
4.5 Tests for Spurious Regressions 
A spurious regression model is one in which the dependent and independent 
variables are non-stationary, but not cointegrated.  Granger and Newbold (1974) 
observed that even when the series are independent of each other, the classical spurious 
regressions had very high R-squared (R2) statistics with very low Durbin-Watson (DW) 
statistics. Since our regressions use time-series data, we need to test whether the high 
degree of fit in the estimations, as measured by high R2 and significant t-tests, is a 
result of “spurious significance”.  The time series literature in our subject implicitly 
uses DW statistics to detect the “spurious significance” problem.  Phillips (1986) 
developed an asymptotic theory that the DW statistic in spurious regressions converges 
in probability to zero as the sample size increases.46   
In order to test whether the variables used in our regressions are stationary 
around a linear trend or have stochastic trends, we first perform the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (ADF) for the presence of unit roots in the variables.  As seen in Table 4 
below, Old, Young, and Urban are I(2); Rintr and Inf are I(0) and the rest are I(1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 The Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test uses the DW statistics, d, obtained from the 
cointegrating regression to test the null hypothesis of d = 0.  If d could be approximated by 2(1-r) and the 
sample first-order correlation coefficient, r, is about 1 (indicating a unit root in the error term), d will be 
zero. (Sargan and Bhargava 1983).   Therefore, a low DW statistics could be taken as a strong sign of 
spurious significance. Nevertheless, Maddala and Kim (1998) indicate that regressions with high DW 
statistics do not necessarily ensure that we do not estimate spurious regressions especially if the sample 
size is relatively small. 
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Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test Results for Unit Roots     
          
      Level           1st Difference           2nd Difference 
Variables ADF t-test Lag c&t ADF t-test Lag c&t ADF t-test Lag c&t
CONS -3.511099 0 ct -7.447739 0       
Y -2.051519 0 ct -5.749789 0       
SSWG -0.805777 2 ct -4.103717 1       
SSWN -0.246096 2 ct -4.909395 1 ct      
HW -1.953167 1 c -4.332534 0       
FW -1.875746 1 ct -2.281867 1       
Rintr -2.698091 0          
CRTP -3.294444 1 ct -5.305846 1       
Inf -4.720763 1          
Old -2.091723 1 ct -1.250801 0  -5.496650 0   
Young -2.710636 1 ct -0.991528 0  -5.469800 0   
LFPR -1.896337 0 ct -6.240468 0 c     
Un -3.011565 1 c -4.700727 0     
Urban -2.310802 1 ct -0.916081 0  -5.477230 0   
SSWGAE -0442997 1 ct -4.640900 1 ct    
SSWG5 -0.708768 2 ct -4.021000 1       
SSWG5AE -0.290429 2 ct -3.757103 1       
SSA1 -0.933166 1 ct -2.835510 1       
SSA2 -1.539332 1 ct -3.580142 0       
LCONS -2.712982 1 ct -7.328273 0       
LCRTP -3.554406 1 ct -5.418992 1       
LHW -2.098230 1 c -3.931846 0       
LFW -2.105252 0 ct -5.397414 0 c      
LSSWG -1.797932 1 ct -4.334073 1       
LY -2.443473 0 ct -5.915426 0        
 
Notes: The test results are obtained by Eviews.  Bold numbers are significant at 5% level to reject the 
null hypothesis states the presence of unit root. We start with four lags in each variable’s ADF regression.  
The longest lag is determined by its significance at 10%. The existence of a constant and time trend in the 
ADF regressions is indicated by c and t respectively.  All variables are as defined before. AE and 5 
attached to SSWG indicate the adaptive expectation method used in the benefit ratio and 5% discount rate 
respectively. The variables that start with L (except LFPR) are the log transformation of the original ones. 
  
Any equilibrium relationship among a set of nonstationary variables implies that 
their stochastic trends must be linked.  This linkage among the stochastic trends 
necessitates that the variables be cointegrated.   Therefore, a key assumption of our 
consumption model is that the disturbance term is stationary.  Since our interest in the 
current context is not to estimate coefficients of the cointegrating vector, we use a 
residual-based test for cointegration in a single equation suggested by Engle and 
Granger (1987) to investigate if the residuals in our regressions are stationary.47  We 
perform the ADF test on our reference regression (Equation 6) in Figure 1 and on the 
other equations from Figure 2 to 6.  As Enders (1995) argues, even though the order of 
integration among variables is important to perform the test, what is ultimately 
                                                 
47 We have also used the Johansen (1988) test for the presence of multiple cointegrating vectors.  The 
results confirm the residual-based ADF test.  
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important is whether or not a combination of variables are cointegrated, and this could 
be achieved through combination of subsets rather than individual series.48  In our case, 
since Rintr is I(0), we test whether the same equations (including only I(1) variables) 
without Rintr are CI(1,1).   
The test results in Table 5 below show that the subsets of I(1) variables are 
CI(1,1) at 5% significance level except for Figure 2, which is CI(1,1) at 10%. We 
conclude that since a linear combination of any of these subsets, which are I(0), with 
Rintr, which is I(0), can only generate a stationary process, the resulting regressions are 
not spurious.  
 
Table 5: Residual-Based Cointegration Tests    
     
 ADF t-test  Lag  
Figure1-6  (Cons, Y, SSWG, HW, FW, CRTP) -6.0712 1  
Figure2     (LCons, LY,LSSWG, LHW, LFW, LCRTP) -5.5767 1  
Figure3     (Cons, Y, SSWN, HW, FW, CRTP) -6.0629 1  
Figure4     (Cons, Y, SSWGAE, HW, FW, CRTP) -5.8921 1  
Figure5-1  (Cons, Y, SSWG5, HW, FW, CRTP) -6.0586 1  
Figure5-2  (Cons, Y, SSWGAE5, HW, FW, CRTP) -5.9070 1  
Figure6-1  (Cons, Y, SSA1, HW, FW, CRTP) -5.8456 1  
Figure6-2  (Cons, Y, SSA2, HW, FW, CRTP) -5.9902 1  
    
Notes: The results are obtained by Eviews. The null hypothesis states no cointegration among the 
variables.  MacKinnon (1991) provides response surface equations for critical values of cointegration tests 
using ADF framework for different sample sizes, significance levels, and number of variables in the 
cointegrating equation. Given six stochastic explanatory variables with a constant and time trend in our 
cointegrating equations, the critical values calculated for the sample size of 34 are -6.4621 for 1%, -
5.5987 for 5%, and 
-5.1836 for 10%.   Optimal lag is chosen using Akaike information criterion (AIC).  Each equation has a 
dummy for the year 1995.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates whether or not the public social security system affects 
consumption in a developing country, Turkey.  It uses a time-series aggregate 
consumption model based on the life-cycle hypothesis.  In order to quantify a social 
security variable in the model, the social security wealth series for Turkey were 
constructed (in a separate study).  These series indicate that the social security wealth is 
a major component of household wealth. 
The empirical tests here show that SSW has a positive effect on consumption.  
Moreover, when the insignificant variables are removed it becomes statistically 
significant. The sensitivity of these results was tested against the major assumptions 
                                                 
48 Enders (1995, 411) gives an example: “Suppose that x1t and x2t are I(2) and x3t is I(1).  If x1t and x2t are 
CI(2,1), there exists a linear combination of the form b1x1t+b2x2t that is I(1).  It is possible that this 
combination of x1t and x2t is cointegrated with x3t such that the linear combination of b1x1t+b2x2t+b3x3t is 
stationary”. 
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embedded in the SSW calculation. The test results confirm that the significance level of 
SSW does not change. 
In addition to the SSW series, “Income from Dwellings” and “Money and 
Quasi-money”, M2, are used as proxies for housing wealth and financial wealth 
respectively.  The first proxy for housing wealth has a significant positive effect on 
consumption.  This is consistent with the fact that people under the conditions of 
shallow financial markets and high political instability invest heavily in housing.  
However, high bequest motives, together with the lack of proper financial instruments, 
such as mortgages, may reduce its power, as an asset, on consumption.  Therefore, the 
direct and imputed income from dwellings may reflect the “true” effects of housing 
wealth on consumption, as we found in our regressions. 
Although significant, the sign of financial assets (FW) contradicts the model.  
However, as noted before, through the price levels, the real money balance could be 
negatively related to consumption.  For example, if nominal interest rates are not so 
responsive to a decline in inflation, as the inflation goes down, it pushes saving up by 
increasing real interest rates.   
Even though time-series studies have several limitations, in order to assess the 
quantitative importance of the positive coefficient of SSW variable, one may want to see 
the magnitude of the reduction in Turkish national saving.  With different assumptions 
and social security wealth definitions, the coefficient ranges from 0.0165 (Figure 3) to 
0.0313 (Figure 5).  In other words, every additional 1 TL of SSW increases the total 
consumption between 0.0165 and 0.0313 TL.  For instance, if we take 2003 and SSWN 
(283,310,716 million TL, with 1987 prices) the consumption is higher 4,816,282 million 
TL (283,310,716 X 0.0165) than would be the case without any social security program.  
If we consume instead of saving by this amount, the private saving falls.  Since Turkey 
has a PAYG system, this reduction is not offset by any increase in the public saving.  As 
a result, the national saving falls as well.  Moreover, the private disposable income is 
reduced by the total contributions (taxes for the old-age, disability and survivor 
insurance).  The total premiums paid in 2003 to SSK, EM and BK is 5,943,740 million 
TL (with 1987 prices).  Since the marginal propensity to save out of NPrvDI is around 
72% (Figure 1, Equation 6), we can conclude that social security contributions also 
reduce saving by 4,279,493 million TL.  Therefore, because of the PAYG system, the 
total saving is lower 9,095,775 million TL (4,279,493 + 4,816,282) than would be the 
case without a PAYG system in Turkey.  National saving in 2003 (by SPO, in 1987 
prices, million TL): 
 
Total Saving             29,482,465 
  Foreign Sources   5,256,678 
  Government Saving (-)   5,743,524 
  Private Saving            29,969,310 
 
 
Without considering the negative effects of the current PAYG system on public saving, 
this implies a 24-percent reduction (9,095,775/(9,095,775 + 29,482,465)) in Turkish 
national saving in 2003.  This reduction is calculated by SSWN and its coefficient, 
0.0165.  However, if we use SSWG and its coefficients estimated with different 
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assumptions, the reduction becomes higher than 24%.  Feldstein (1974, 1996) makes the 
same calculation and finds that social security depresses personal saving 30-60 percent 
for the US.  
As Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) point out, time-series studies have several 
drawbacks in estimating the effects of social security on saving. Moreover, the 
empirical analyses could be extended to include some omitted variables, such as 
external and government savings by disaggregating the income variable49.  Likewise, 
the SSW variable could also be improved by doing further “fine-tunings”. Lastly, as 
commonly used in investigations, error correction models with flexible distributed lags 
can be applied.     
But this paper’s goal was limited: determining whether or not a time-series 
aggregate consumption model for a developing country, Turkey, could provide 
relatively consistent evidence that the social security wealth has negative effects on 
saving as argued in the literature for developed countries.  Turkey has a generous public 
social security system.  The results, with both social security proxies, show that social 
security wealth has a significant positive effect on consumption, and this could be 
interpreted that public social security reduces saving in Turkey. 
If social security provisions reduce saving, as shown here, there should be an 
“opportunity cost” of having an unfunded social security system, regardless of whether 
or not it is in balance.  Therefore, reforms ultimately need to address two problems 
together:  financial sustainability of social security systems over the coming decades 
and their negative effects on saving.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Since an increase in external saving raises the total sources available for the private sector, it might be 
positively related to consumption.  Besides, given the value of government spending, an increase or 
decrease in government saving may have a direct effect on the total sources available for the private 
sector.  The effects of government saving on consumption could be explained from a national accounting 
perspective.  As you may recall, we define the net private disposable income (NPrvDI) as follows:  
NPrvDI = NNP – TX + TR + NINT (a) 
Since Government Saving (GS) can be defined as follows: 
GS = TX – G – TR – NINT ? TR + NINT – TX = - GS - G   (b) 
when we substitute (b) into (a) we get the following expression: 
NPrvDI = NNP – GS – G   
Therefore, the income variable, NPrvDI, in the regressions, implicitly assumes that the sum of the 
coefficients of NNP, GS and G are restricted to be the same as the coefficient of NPrvDI.  If we relax this 
restriction, we can observe whether or not GS and G have different negative effects on consumption.  
Observation of this effect is not possible with the standard LCM approach.  
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Appendix: Social Security Wealth Series for Turkey 
 
SSW is the aggregate present value of future social security annuities with survival 
probabilities anticipated by people.  Since it’s a highly concentrated work, we 
constructed the SSWG and SSTX series for Turkey in a different study (Author, 2005). 
Therefore, we present here only the basic logic of the calculations for the net and gross 
social security wealth (SSWN and SSWG), which is very similar to one calculated by 
Feldstein (1974).  
Benefits (Future Annuities -- SSWG): 
• If an individual at the age of (a) in year (t) survives to age ra50, and if his 
current real disposable income, , grows at a constant rate of growth, g, then 
he’ll have a disposable income at the age of ra:  
),( taY
)()1( aratarat gYY
−
−+ +=
• In order to find the first annual social security benefit at ra for that particular 
individual, we look at the past data and come up with a benefit factor, bf, which 
is basically a ratio of per retiree annual old-age benefits to per capita NPrvDI51. 
• Given that factor, the individual will be entitled to his first annual social 
security benefit at age ra, which is . )(),( )1(
ara
ttta gYbfB
−+=
• We assume that real annuities grow after ra by ga52 until the truncated 
maximum age of 85. 
• Given the survival probabilities for that particular individual, the actuarial 
present value can be calculated at the age of ra, where  presents the 
probability of living at least up to the age of j, given that the person lived to age 
i. 
),( jiS
),( jiS
• With the personal discount rate (d)53 for future real incomes, the present value 
calculation becomes at the age of ra: 
∑ −−−
≥
++ )()(),(),( )1()1( ranrantanra
ran
dgBS  
• At time (t), after substituting , the person has   ),( taB
[ ] [ ]∑ −≥− ++++= )85()85,(85)(),(),( )1/()1()1/()1( rararaararaattta dgSdgSYbfA  
which also includes survival probabilities between ra and age a at time (t). 
• We calculated the gross SSW annually by summing the wealth for each age 
groups an genders in six groups: workers, workers’ wives, old-age retirees, old-
age retirees’ wives, disability retirees and survivors. 
 
 Taxes (future social security tax liabilities – SSTX): 
• If the same individual at the age of (a) in year (t) survives to age ra, and if his 
                                                 
50 We assume that the retirement age is not endogenous.  That is, people get retired at the same age, which 
is 55 for both genders in our calculations. 
51 We use three different expectation methods for benefit (and tax) factors: average (constant) factors, the 
adaptive expectation method (with arbitrarily chosen weights: 50% for the first year and 25% for the last 
two years each) and current benefit (and tax) factors method. 
52 We assumed that the growth rate of real annuities can be 2% or zero.  
53 We used 3% and 5% alternatively. 
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current real disposable income, , grows at a constant rate of growth, g, then 
the present value of all his future taxes until age ra is  
),( taY
[ amtra
am
amtmata dgYSTAX
−
=
−+ ++= ∑ )1/()1(,, θ ] , where θ is the ratio of social 
security taxes (Old-age, disability and survival — ODS) per worker to per 
capita disposable income and the person expects that at the age m he will pay a 
tax of  .  We compute the social security tax liabilities 
(SSTX) for a given year by summing the tax liability of current working men 
and working women.  
am
tamtamt gYT
−
−+−+ += )1(θ
When we subtract the present value of future taxes (SSTX) from the present value of 
benefits (SSWG), we find SSWN: ttt SSTXSSWGSSWN −= .  Aggregated SSWG and 
SSTX formulas for each group are given in Figure 7.  Assumptions, data sources and 
more detail can be found in Author (2005).   
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Figure 7: Aggregate SSWG and SSTX Formulas for Turkey                   
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M = Male, F = Female, G=Gender, t = year, a = age at time t, ra = retirement age, ara = average age for retirees, m = 
age between current age a and retirement age ra, n = age between retirement age ra and the maximum age, 85, w= 
wives, O=orphans, d = personal discount rate, g = growth rate of real reference income, ga= growth rate of real 
annuities, W = number of employers, P = LFPR adjustment factor, C = ratio of active insured employment to total 
employment, θ  = tax factor, Y = reference income, AVB = per retiree average old-age benefit, ABD= per retiree average 
disability benefit, ABSW= per retiree (wives) average survivors benefit, ABSO= per retiree (orphans) average survivors 
benefit = survival probability of a person who lives up to age m, given that she/he lived up to age a, bf = benefit 
factor, N = number of old-age beneficiaries, sr = % of male married, BR = discount ratio for benefits passed from worker 
or retirees to survivors. 
),( maS
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